Executive Summary

About this document

This is the Executive Summary of the Technical Report of the Fourth UK Climate Change Risk Assessment (CCRA4). It sets the context for CCRA4 and provides some key background information.

Lead authors: Jason A. Lowe, Mark Harrison, Rachel J. Perks

Contributing authors: Lee Chapman, Susanne Lorenz, Daniel Williams, Tyrone Dunbar, Emily Barker, Robert Ivory, Daniel Palmer, Liam Farrar, Hayley Fowler

Additional contributors: Florence Bates, Elizabeth Fuller, Richard Millar, Olivia Shears

This publication is available in PDF format at the end of the page >

Executive Summary

Headline findings

• Climate change is causing serious impacts on the UK. Climate change is already having significant negative impacts across the UK, and there will be further impacts in the future, although the severity will vary between nations. Around two thirds of the assessed risks have a High or Very High magnitude by the 2030s.
• Several key aspects of climate change are accelerating, causing unprecedented extreme weather events and serious impacts. Global warming has accelerated since the Third Climate Change Risk Assessment Technical Report, CCRA3-IA TR, in 2021. The increase in extreme events, such as UK heatwaves, and other impacts of climate change, such as sea level rise, are also accelerating. There have been numerous unprecedented extreme weather events leading to serious impacts. For example, the UK experienced temperatures of over 40 °C for the first time during the July 2022 heatwave; this led to wildfires and contributed to almost 3,000 deaths in England across five heat episodes that summer. As further climate change is inevitable, we will continue to experience previously unprecedented events. The magnitude of long-term impacts will depend on future global greenhouse gas emissions.
• Climate risks to the UK are now higher than in CCRA3-IA TR. The expert judgement of the majority of the report authors affirms that current and future impacts from climate risks are, overall, higher than at the time of the last assessment. This is based on new evidence of accelerating changes in climate, evidence of potential increases in exposure and/or vulnerability, and a lack of adaptation progress.
• In the new study we assess 41 risks and 2 opportunities. By 2050, with global warming reaching 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, almost one third of the risks are assessed as being Very High magnitude. A new category of ‘Very High magnitude’ has been added to the assessment to quantify impacts in the order of billions of pounds of economic damages per year, thousands of deaths per year, or the loss of species groups. The number of risks assessed to have Very High magnitude underlines the increasing level of risk faced. For example:
  • Risks to people from heat are already causing deaths in the UK, and this is projected to rise significantly in the future, increasing by several thousand people per year by the 2050s.
  • Flood risk to buildings and communities across the UK, despite significant public investment in flood defences, is expected to affect approximately 6.3 million properties in England, 45,000 in Northern Ireland, 400,000 in Scotland and 245,000 in Wales.
  • Risks to UK macroeconomic performance and stability, with even the most cautious estimates of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) losses, project damages that greatly exceed 1% of GDP.
  • Risks to the delivery of infrastructure services (such as road, rail, digital communications, and water) from interdependencies with other infrastructure systems, result in economic impacts potentially costing billions of pounds per year by the 2050s across the UK.
  • Risks to terrestrial and coastal ecosystems meaning that, for example, UK seabirds such as puffins, storm petrels, and Arctic skuas are possibly declining by up to 80% due to warming seas.
• Many overseas climate change risks have important consequences for the UK. Climate change impacts overseas are having damaging effects on the UK. For example, noticeably higher food prices and a lack of products on supermarket shelves are related to disruptions to imports of products and raw ingredients for processed foods. Many important international supply chains are sensitive to weather extremes and pose risks to UK prosperity, including from disruption to the supply of essential minerals and semiconductors which are used in sectors including defence, telecommunications, the automotive industry and in medical technologies. These risks are expected to increase.
• Current and planned adaptation measures are not sufficient to manage these risks or take advantage of new opportunities. Adaptation plans do not significantly change the assessed magnitude for most risks and are not keeping pace with climate change. There is not enough evidence that current and planned adaptation measures are effective. Unlike in CCRA3-IA TR, none of the risks have been assessed as Sustain current action on adaptation at the UK level.
• Nearly two thirds of the risks are assessed as needing increased adaptation action to manage potential impacts from climate change. To increase the granularity of the current assessment, a ‘Critical’ category has been added to identify the highest urgency risks for adaptation action. The definitions of other adaptation action categories remain the same as in CCRA3-IA TR. In total, eight of the risks are in the new highest Critical action needed category, covering risks to: people from heat, buildings, and communities from heat as well as flooding, the UK’s macroeconomic performance and stability, physical assets of UK businesses (domestic and overseas), financial institutions and the financial system, delivery of infrastructure services from interdependencies within other infrastructure systems, and food security. A further 19 risks are assessed as More action needed.
• Almost one third of the risks require Critical investigation. New scientific evidence has reduced uncertainty in many sectors, but there are significant evidence gaps or uncertainties that must be addressed before several potentially significant risks can be fully assessed. However, in the majority of cases these risks are accompanied by strong evidence of the need for increased adaptation in the near-term while the longer-term consequences of the risk are investigated.

Rapid changes in UK climate

The UK climate is changing rapidly and significant impacts are now caused by extremes of heat and rainfall, as well as from rising sea levels. The UK has warmed by around 0.25 °C per decade since the 1980s and is warming faster than the global average. In 2022, the UK experienced its first 40 °C day, virtually impossible without climate change. A 40 °C day has become four times more likely over the last three decades. Rainfall has also increased, with the most recent decade being 10% wetter than the 1961-1990 average, mostly due to increases in winter rainfall. UK sea levels have risen by more than 19 cm since 1901 and this rate of increase is accelerating, with two thirds of this rise in the last 30 years.

Figure ES1, below, shows a range of extreme weather and climate trends causing impacts to all parts of the UK. In many cases it is now possible to estimate how much human driven climate change has altered weather extremes. Examples are given in Figure ES1 and further down in Table ES1 (below).

Figure ES1: Infographic of examples of observed changes in UK climate.

Human driven climate change is causing warmer, wetter winters and hotter, drier summers in the UK. Further changes in climate and extreme weather events are inevitable, but the rate and magnitude of the changes will depend on future global emissions (Lowe et al., 2018). More extreme weather events will occur over all parts of the UK, but there will be some differences in rates of change at different locations. These future changes will require that we adapt. Further details regarding future climate extremes can be found in the State of the Climate Chapter.

Compound extremes, where impacts are amplified by multiple hazards occurring simultaneously or in close succession, are increasing. Hot, dry summers are expected to occur more frequently, reducing river flows and worsening drought impacts. At the same time, climate model projections show a sizeable increase in extreme compound summer rainfall events, with an increase in heavy rainfall occurring within a short time window, potentially driving more flash flooding. Compound wind and rainfall extremes are projected to increase, driven by increased rainfall intensity and a strengthened jet stream. This could potentially cause more damage to infrastructure during winter storms. Compound flooding from storm surges and riverine flooding is likely to increase, leading to more damage in low lying coastal areas.

The potential for further changes, associated with earth system tipping points cannot be ruled out. These include abrupt or irreversible changes, such as major changes in the circulation of the Atlantic Ocean, which would have a major impact on UK extreme weather, or accelerated sea-level rise resulting from more rapid loss of ice from the continental ice sheets. The likelihood of these tipping points being triggered over the next few decades remains uncertain but will increase with the level of global warming. If triggered many of the impacts of tipping points won’t be fully experienced for decades or even centuries.

There is increasing evidence that climate change is already having significant impacts. Increasing evidence highlights that changes in the types of extreme weather experienced by the UK are driving many types of impacts. Many studies have now directly linked the rising severity and frequency of weather extremes to warming caused by greenhouse gases (see Table ES1). Growing consequences of climate change are evident on people, infrastructure and nature.

Table ES1: Summary of recent attribution studies for UK climate hazards.

Climate risks affect all sectors across all parts of the UK

This assessment has considered both the magnitude of risks, and the urgency of action needed to address the risks using the method outlined in Box ES1. A set of 41 risks and 2 opportunities have been identified, looking across all four nations, from present day to the 2080s. These risks have been structured as best as possible to align with UK government policy areas and were defined through engagement with government departments. Each risk has been assessed for each nation by leading experts in their respective fields, following a strict methodology that was designed in conjunction with the CCC to ensure a consistent approach to the assessment of risk and opportunities across five different sectors. The sectors covered are: Health and Wellbeing; Built Environment; Land, Nature, and Food; Infrastructure; and Economy. The results have been peer reviewed by a panel of experts and by an open process with the wider scientific and policy communities.

Magnitude of risk to the UK

The consequences of climate change are being felt across all parts of the UK. While there are some differences in risk magnitude between the four nations of the UK, climate change will have negative consequences in the future across all nations and for all sectors considered in the risk assessment.

The report finds that all four nations and all sectors have risks at the Very High magnitude (the highest level of potential impact) by the 2050s and a significant proportion of the resultant consequences will be felt much sooner. In this report we assess that 13 of the 41 risks (equivalent to around 32% of risks) and one of the opportunities (E8: Opportunities to UK businesses and financial institutions from delivering adaptation goods and services) are scored at the Very High magnitude in at least one nation by the 2050s, even after accounting for planned adaptation and in the central climate scenario. A total of 10 risks (around 24% of risks) and one of the opportunities have a Very high magnitude across all nations by the 2050s. When the higher climate scenario is considered, the risks increase, with some Very High magnitude impacts happening earlier (see Figure ES3).

The consequences of many climate hazards will be experienced even in the near-term. Of the 13 risks (equivalent to around 32% of risks) assessed as Very high magnitude in the 2050s, five risks (around 12% of all risks) will have reached this threshold by the 2030s with four risks assessed at this level in the present day. The timing of different magnitude levels, taken as the highest from any of the four nations and including planned adaptation is shown in Figure ES2 below.

Figure ES2. Bar chart showing number of risks and opportunities (taking the maximum score across all nations and the case with planned adaptation) in the Very High magnitude category for each time period. Blue bars show the number of risks and opportunities in the central warming scenario and orange shows the number in the high warming scenario.

Urgency of action

Urgency scores are summarised in Figures ES3 and ES4. When taken across the UK using the highest component score from any of the nations, eight risks (20% of risks) are now judged as Critical action needed (i.e. where there is established evidence of Very High risk magnitude combined with the need for critical new, stronger or different action planned), with a further 19 risks (46% of risks) identified as More action needed. This means that 66% of all risks considered require more action to manage the risk effectively. Additionally, there are 12 risks (29% of risks) requiring Critical investigation and two risks (5% of risks) requiring Further investigation. One opportunity is assessed as Critical investigation and another as Further investigation. In a significant shift from the previous assessment, Sustain current action or Watching brief is judged to be unsuitable for any risks or opportunities when viewed across the UK as a whole, although there are two risks (5% of risks) where at least one nation has a Sustain current action score. The overall UK urgency scoring for risks, taken as the maximum from all four nations, is summarised for each sector in Figure ES4. The urgency scores for the different nations of the UK are shown in more detail in Tables E3a-e.

It is useful to note that risks and opportunities within the economy chapter often integrate components from other chapters. This wider scope, whilst a real feature of the economy and finance system, means that the High and Very High magnitude thresholds (annual damages or forgone opportunities of £ hundreds of millions, and £ billions) are reached more easily than in other systems. The Technical Report identifies impacts in the order of billions of pounds of damages, or for risks considering the macroeconomy, in the order of 4-8% of UK GDP or tens of billions of pounds of damages by the 2080s. While the magnitudes are High in the context of the whole report, they are comparatively low in the context of the UK’s macroeconomy and financial stability.

Figure ES3: Infographic of the urgency of responding to all risks impacting the UK.

Figure ES4: Urgency scores for the UK shown for each risk and opportunity.

Taking account of all evidence, the authors of this technical report have concluded that the magnitude of impact from the risks are higher than that in previous assessments. The percentage of risks in each category in CCRA3-IA TR and CCRA4-IA TR are shown in Figure ES5. The increase in future risk has mainly been driven by new evidence of accelerating changes in climate and evidence of potential increases in exposure and/or vulnerability. This includes recorded events and lived experiences, such as the first summer day warmer than 40 °C and the severe drought in summer 2025, with their resulting impacts. It is consistent with the Climate Change Committee’s most recent progress reports for the UK, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, which conclude that delivery of effective adaptation remains limited, with progress too slow to respond to keep up with changing risks. During the five years since the previous report (CCRA3-IA TR), the climate has continued to change, with further evidence of the impact of our changing climate accumulating each year. This trend in both climate change and climate impacts will undoubtedly continue without substantially increased adaptation efforts.

Many risks that were previously highlighted as requiring Further investigation are now judged to require Critical investigation. The percentage of risks and opportunities in each category in CCRA3-IA TR and CCRA4-IA TR are shown in Figure ES5. Additionally, the overwhelming majority of the risks in the Critical investigation category (8 of the 12 risks) and one of the opportunities also require (at minimum) action under the More action needed category in the present day or 2030s (Table ES2).

Table ES2: Risks and opportunities rated Critical investigation overall that have at least one time period up to the 2050s that include More action needed.

Figure ES5. Percentage of risks and opportunities in each urgency category from CCRA3-IA TR and CCRA4-IA TR. More action needed (MAN), Further investigation (FI), Sustain current action (SCA) and Watching brief (WB) have the same meaning in both assessments. Critical action needed (CAN) and Critical investigation (CI) are new categories for CCRA4-IA TR.

The evidence for informing risks in the UK is improving but gaps remain.

This Technical Report illustrates that the evidence base has continued to improve since CCRA3-IA TR, but significant evidence gaps remain across all five sectors. Often, these pertain to uneven data and evidence availability across the four nations, with frequent gaps evident in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, whereas others are due to the rapidly changing nature of some of the sectors. In general, as per previous assessments, evidence for current levels of risk is stronger than future levels as the uncertainty in local climate change increases over time. Additionally, changes in exposure (such as population) and effectiveness of adaptation can be uncertain, impacting confidence in the urgency scoring of risks over long-term time horizons. Further research is also needed to better understand cascading risks, which remain a major uncertainty but are still poorly quantified in most sectors.

In quantitative terms, 14 risks (34% of the risks) and both opportunities in this assessment were judged to require additional investigation (Further investigation and Critical investigation), with 12 out of 14 risks and one of the opportunities in the new Critical investigation category. This compares with 35% in CCRA3-IA TR (Further investigation). The new Critical investigation category, which aligns the assessment with the precautionary principle, ensures that any risks with the strong potential for impacts of Very High magnitude are not overlooked simply due to a lack of current evidence.

An overall score of Critical investigation needed is based on the risk magnitude and confidence in the evidence from present day, the 2030s and 2050s. For these risks, improved evidence is urgently needed to fully establish the level of action needed, and especially whether the risk will progress to the Critical action needed category. For several of the risks assessed in the Critical investigation category, there is higher confidence in the nearer term which means action can be taken now. The risks for which there is a clear case for at least More action needed whilst the Critical investigation takes place are shown in Table ES2.

Table 1E3a: Summary table of the national urgency score for the risks and opportunities in the Health and Wellbeing chapter. The urgency scores are abbreviated as follows: Critical action needed – CAN, Critical investigation – CI, More action needed – MAN, Further investigation – FI, Watching brief – WB, Sustain current action – SCA.

Table 2E3b: Summary table of the national urgency score for the risks and opportunities in the Built Environment chapter. The urgency scores are abbreviated as follows: Critical action needed – CAN, Critical investigation – CI, More action needed – MAN, Further investigation – FI, Watching brief – WB, Sustain current action – SCA.

Table 3E3c: Summary table of the national urgency score for the risks and opportunities in the Land, Nature and Food chapter. The urgency scores are abbreviated as follows: Critical action needed – CAN, Critical investigation – CI, More action needed – MAN, Further investigation – FI, Watching brief – WB, Sustain current action – SCA.

Table 4E3d: Summary table of the national urgency score for the risks and opportunities in the Infrastructure chapter. The urgency scores are abbreviated as follows: Critical action needed – CAN, Critical investigation – CI, More action needed – MAN, Further investigation – FI, Watching brief – WB, Sustain current action – SCA.

Table 5E3e: Summary table of the national urgency score for the risks and opportunities in the Economy chapter. The urgency scores are abbreviated as follows: Critical action needed – CAN, Critical investigation – CI, More action needed – MAN, Further investigation – FI, Watching brief – WB, Sustain current action – SCA.

Health and Wellbeing

Figure ES6: Urban green spaces, such as Kelvingrove Park in Glasgow, can deliver a range of physical and mental health benefits such as reducing chronic stress and encouraging exercise. Source: Adobe Stock

This Report Card provides a summary of the Health and Wellbeing chapter of the CCRA4 Independent Assessment’s Technical Report, including an overview of each of the risks assessed as requiring the most urgent action or investigation. Full details including regional variations can be found in the chapter.

Chapter summary

Climate change presents a major threat to the health and wellbeing of vulnerable groups in the UK, such as young children, elderly people, pregnant people, people with underlying health conditions, and underprivileged and minority groups. The risks are both direct, through extreme weather and associated impacts such as heatwaves or flooding, and indirect, such as through the spread of novel diseases.

• The need for action on risks to health and wellbeing has become more urgent due to new evidence and continued warming in the five years since the previous Climate Change Risk Assessment (CCRA3-IA TR).
• Extreme heat is an important factor which can worsen all health risks. Heatwaves increase hospital admissions, worsen air quality, and strain healthcare services, for example, overheating incidents in hospitals in England have increased 53% in the last ten years. Heat-related deaths are projected to potentially triple by the 2080s (H1).
• Flooding is a major risk to public health in the UK with increasing evidence showing it causes long-term mental health issues. About 18 people per year die in floods in England and this could increase to about 29 people per year by the 2050s, accounting for population growth (H2).
• Poor air quality is harmful for health. It is currently unclear how climate change and adaptation measures will alter air pollutants in the future and this urgently needs further research.
• Emerging infectious diseases are a growing concern (H4). Higher temperatures and changing rainfall patterns will spread diseases rarely seen before in the UK, like West Nile virus, tick-borne encephalitis and dengue fever, some of which could become endemic in London by the 2060s.
• Many adaptation measures for health rely on improving and expanding infrastructure such as childcare facilities, schools, hospitals and social care structures, and these are themselves vulnerable to extreme climate events (H6). While NHS organizations have climate plans, adaptation is uneven, especially in care homes and primary care.
• Strong evidence shows that adaptation strategies based around green and blue spaces (such as parks, forests, lakes and coasts) can present opportunities for climate resilience and public health (Box 3.1). For example, parks in cities reduce the urban heat island effect and provide space for recreation.

Increases in heat and extreme heat pose a significant health threat. It contributes to diseases, affects medication efficacy and can impact wellbeing through lack of sleep. Vulnerable groups such as older people and those with underlying health conditions are disproportionately affected by extreme heat.

• High temperatures result in thousands of deaths per year in the UK. There is growing evidence of links to specific diseases, such as cardiovascular, respiratory and renal diseases, as well as negative mental health outcomes. Long-term data are needed to understand chronic heat exposure impacts. Heat-related mortality is generally higher in London and South East England.
• Heat-related deaths across the UK could triple by the 2080s, dependent on population growth and adaptation action.
• Policy responses in England and Scotland are fragmented and are lacking in Wales and Northern Ireland, so critical action is needed to address the very high risk posed by extreme heat later in the century.

Although the evidence of critical health impacts from poor air quality are clear, causing approximately 30,000 deaths per year in the UK, it is unclear how much these can be attributed to climate change. Climate change could interact with air quality in multiple ways. For example, high temperatures can increase the formation of ozone at ground level, or changing weather patterns could trap or move pollutants over large areas.

• Critical Investigation is needed to fully understand this risk as there is limited evidence on how much climate change currently contributes to poor air quality or how this could change in the future.

Aside from heat, flooding causes the most widespread health impacts in the UK. Other risks from extreme weather include those from drought, storms (including wind, hail and thunder), wildfire, and cold.

• Currently, 6.1 million people in the UK are at risk of flooding and this is projected to rise significantly with climate change. Health costs from flooding, including for mental health, are currently estimated to be hundreds of millions of pounds annually.
• Cold weather will continue to pose a risk to health in the UK – despite winters getting warmer, moderate cold events alone will remain a greater health risk than heat until at least the 2070s.
• Droughts and wildfire are less well documented in the UK but are expected to grow, with indirect health consequences. For example, significant numbers of farmers have reported feeling anxious and depressed during recent periods of extreme weather.
• More action is needed as current and planned adaptation measures are limited, in particular there is an evidence gap around health consequences for non-flood-related extreme weather.

Higher temperatures and changing rainfall patterns will improve conditions for disease transmission and survival and could lead to the emergence of novel diseases and pests across the UK.

• There is evidence that climate change has improved conditions in the UK for some disease-causing bacteria, such as Campylobacter, Salmonella and Vibrio.
• Mosquito-borne diseases are an emerging risk in the UK. West Nile Virus recently appeared in the UK for the first time, likely due to climate change.
• The Asian tiger mosquito (A. albopictus) may establish across England by the 2040s and other UK nations by the 2060s. Dengue fever could become endemic in London by the 2060s.
• Significant evidence gaps exist around understanding of future risks across different nations, particularly from emerging diseases.
• Although the UK Biological Security Strategy offers a foundation to make the UK resilient to biological threats, more action is needed to address the limited evidence of effective implementation of adaptation action across the UK.

The continuity and quality of healthcare are increasingly threatened by the risk of flooding, overheating, and extreme weather events, which disrupt services, damage infrastructure, and strain staff.

• Overheating incidents in English hospitals increased by 53% from 2016 to 2024, with the July 2022 heatwave causing treatment delays and IT outages at Guy’s and St Thomas’ Hospital in London. Supply chain disruptions from extreme weather will compound these risks.
• About 26% of health facilities in the UK are at risk of flooding — for example, Storm Ciaran resulted in ward closures and patient relocations at Ulster Hospital during — and is projected to reach 32% by the 2050s.
• Although NHS organizations must produce climate-focused Green Plans, more action is needed as adaptation remains uneven, especially in care home settings.
• Addressing the gaps identified in the Fourth Health and Climate Adaptation Report (2025) would strengthen resilience in health sector and reduce future risk.

Built Environment

Figure ES7: Flooding by the River Severn in Bridgnorth, Shropshire, in March 2020, a few weeks after Storm Dennis resulted in severe property damage and evacuations. Flooding is a major and growing risk for communities across the UK. Image credit: Adobe Stock

This Report Card provides a summary of the Built Environment chapter of the CCRA4 Independent Assessment’s Technical Report, including an overview of each of the risks assessed as requiring the most urgent action or investigation. Full details including regional variations can be found in the chapter.

Chapter summary

The UK’s built environment, encompassing both residential and non-residential buildings across urban and rural landscapes, faces mounting risks from climate change. These risks are unevenly distributed, disproportionately affecting vulnerable populations in deprived neighbourhoods and isolated communities.

• Overheating and flooding are the most critical risks for buildings and communities, with millions of people already affected across the UK (BE1, BE2).
• Prolonged overheating in buildings leads to health issues and cascading effects (BE1). For instance, overheating impacts the health and comfort of people in homes, workplaces and public buildings, such as prisons and schools. Heat can lower productivity and cognitive performance, with evidence showing that academic test scores in schools have been affected (BE7). Energy demand from cooling technologies is projected to rise in the future but can be partially offset by passive cooling strategies (BE9).
• Current flood risk is high and will worsen across all nations, with 6.3 million existing properties in flood-risk areas in England, 45,000 in Northern Ireland, 400,000 in Scotland, and 245,100 in Wales (BE2). More intense rainfall will increase the risk of surface water and river flooding, threatening people’s homes, essential services (BE7) and emergency service facilities (BE8).
• New evidence shows that some risks from climate change will have greater impacts than previously thought, for example, increased subsidence from reduced summer rainfall (BE4).
• Adapting the UK’s building stock to address long-term climate risks presents significant challenges and more action is required across all risks in this sector. An important gap is around adaptation actions for existing buildings.
• More evidence of climate impacts on the built environment and of the effectiveness of adaptation action are needed for individual countries, particularly Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, where gaps exist across several risks. However, information on climate impacts or effectiveness of adaptation in any one nation is often relevant across the whole UK and so evidence is available on which to plan action, taking into account local context.

Rising temperatures and heatwaves are overheating buildings and already impacting millions, particularly in England. Most existing buildings in the UK are expected to still be in use in the mid-to-late century, and many are poorly adapted to the extreme temperatures expected in the future.

• Millions of people are already affected by overheating in buildings. In 2023, 12% of households in England reported that their homes got uncomfortably hot.
• Hotter summers, higher nighttime temperatures and more frequent and severe heatwaves in the future will lead to an increase building overheating across the UK over the rest of this century.
• Although some adaptation actions for overheating exist within planning measures and building regulations for new developments, critical action is needed around adaptation for existing buildings and to address a lack of evidence for the effectiveness of current adaptation actions, particularly in Northern Ireland and Scotland.

Flooding is a major and growing risk for communities, with the frequency and intensity of extreme rainfall events increasing due to climate change. Urban expansion and ageing infrastructure will make this risk worse.

• Currently, 1.9 million people are at high risk of flooding in England. Adaptation action has meant that about 200,000 properties were protected during storms Babet and Henk (2023/24).
• By 2050, the number of properties at flood risk in the UK is expected to increase by 27%. By 2080, annual damages for a single event could rise to £1.7 billion from £1.1 billion in England, but the highest damages per person are expected in flood-risk areas of Northern Ireland.
• Despite significant ongoing investment in flood and coastal erosion risk management, critical action is needed to address the high number of people and properties at risk of flooding now and as the climate changes. There are specific issues around slow project delivery and planning enforcement, while inconsistent methodology and data make UK-wide risk comparisons difficult.

This risk spans historic buildings, archaeological sites, monuments, collections, underwater heritage, and the cultural character of landscapes, including intangible elements like festivals and traditional crafts. The loss and damage of cultural heritage landscapes due to climate change is now seen as inevitable.

• Climate change is already affecting cultural heritage and landscapes. For example, 23 of the 35 UK World Heritage Sites are reported as exposed to climate risks; 74% of sites are exposed at risk from flooding, 26% from sea-level rise and storm surges, and 13% from severe weather events.
• By the 2060s, 70% of National Trust sites across England, Wales and Northern Ireland may face a high or medium level of risk from climate change hazards, rising from 30% in the present day.
• While significant effort has gone into adaptation guidance for heritage sites, this effort is variable across nations and critical investigation is needed to understand the effectiveness of existing adaptation, as well as climate impacts on intangible aspects of our heritage and the wider cultural sector.

Weather events requiring emergency responses are expected to increase in the future, particularly with population growth and urban expansion. These events can sharply increase the demand for emergency services, straining resources, especially as incidents increasingly overlap or follow each other closely.

• Wildfires are already straining emergency services. By mid-June 2025, English and Welsh fire services had responded to 564 wildfires, more than double the 277 wildfires recorded by mid-June in 2022, the previous worst year on record.
• There is an increasing threat to emergency service infrastructure. For example, between 2040-2060, 20% more emergency service facilities in England could be at risk of flooding.
• Frameworks surrounding planning and response exist, but critical investigation is still needed due to limited data and metrics available to assess this risk, specifically around financial costs, operational delays, and physical demands on emergency services under future climate scenarios.

Coastal communities and buildings located in low-lying or erosion-prone areas are often highly at risk from climate change. Increased storminess and sea-level rise are accelerating shoreline erosion. This leads to displaced communities, harm to ecosystems, and costs from repeatedly damaged infrastructure.

• The coastal regions of Norfolk, Suffolk, and Yorkshire are particularly vulnerable with some areas retreating at rates of 2 to 4 metres per year. The Welsh coastline also has erosion ‘hotspots’ in parts of the Llyn Peninsula, Conwy Bay and Barry Island.
• 3,500 properties in England and 650 properties in Scotland are in areas that will be at significant risk from erosion by 2055 and 2050 respectively.
• Increasing sea levels will be a major challenge, with Edinburgh expected to see between 30-40cm of sea level rise by the 2080s.
• Significant investment has been put into coastal flood and erosion defences and adaptation plans are being put in place across the UK, but more action is needed as risks are increasing more quickly than current plans can address.

Other climate risks to the built environment come from wind-driven rain, storms, subsidence, high winds, and wildfires. Western Scotland and Wales are at highest risk of wind-driven rain, which increases the chance of moisture damage, mould, and material decay, particularly in heritage buildings.

• Adverse weather is contributing to increasing home claims. In 2023, the value of storm-related claims in the UK was £133 million, with a further £153 million related to burst pipes (excluding flood-related claims), largely caused by the succession of storms in Autumn 2023.
• Declining average summer rainfall contributes to worsening soil drought and increases subsidence risk with most clay-rich areas likely to be affected by subsidence by 2080. Wildfires are an emerging risk; hazardous fire weather days could increase five-fold under 4°C warming.
• Adaptation efforts taking place include updated building standards to address adverse weather and new Welsh legislation to addressing coal tip landslides, but more action is needed to address risks to existing buildings and to respond to emerging risks like wildfires.

Indoor Environmental Quality (IEQ) refers to conditions within a building, including thermal comfort (BE1) and indoor air quality (IAQ). It can impact people’s health and wellbeing, particularly vulnerable groups. Non-climate factors such as building design have a major influence, but IAQ can be affected by climate change through rising temperatures, increased humidity and altered rainfall patterns.

• Damp or mould currently affects almost 1 million, but potentially up to 6.5 million, households in England, contributing to over 10,000 cases of respiratory conditions per year.
• Wildfires can triple indoor particulate levels. Although emission reductions are expected to drive greater improvements in air quality than climate change effects through to the 2050s, heatwaves and rising wildfire risk may worsen pollution episodes.
• Despite progress in ventilation standards for new buildings, more action is needed to gather baseline data and consistent metrics for assessment in order to understand future IAQ risk.

Public service facilities such as prisons, schools, and sports facilities are increasingly exposed to climate-related risks, mainly from overheating and flooding, which will be exacerbated by climate change.

• Currently, nearly 50% of schools in England are at risk from flooding, affecting 1.2 million pupils.
• By the 2050s, all prison estates in England and Wales will face a high risk of summer overheating, and up to 89% of prisons may also face severe flood risk.
• By the 2080s cumulative lost learning time in schools could reach 14 days annually, with children in Southern England experiencing ‘severe’ cognitive performance loss for over 80% of the Spring and Summer months without adaptation action.
• Adaptation action is highly variable across the UK and largely focussed on schools and prisons, particularly in England, with limited evidence of progress or effectiveness. More action is needed to address climate risks for non-residential buildings other than schools and prisons.

Demand for cooling in the summer will rise due to increasing temperatures and more frequent heatwaves, while demand for heating in the winter will decline. Summer energy bills are influenced by the adoption of air conditioning (AC) and passive adaptation measures like shading or reflective roofs.

• An estimated 8–19% of UK households currently own AC units, with 80% of purchases made since 2022. Greater London has the highest current adoption rate of AC units.
• Demand for cooling in the summer will rise along with increases in temperature, particularly in England.
• Some action is being taken across the UK to consider overheating, for example in regulations for new buildings or in local government adaptation plans, but overall more action is needed to monitor and manage the cost of increased cooling for households, particularly low income and vulnerable households.

Land, Nature, and Food

Figure ES8: Firefighters tackle a grass fire on an upland moor in Wales. Wildfires are an emerging climate risk across the UK, threatening ecosystems, carbon stores and forestry. Image credit: Adobe Stock

This Report Card provides a summary of the Land, Nature, and Food chapter of the CCRA4 Independent Assessment’s Technical Report, including an overview of each of the risks assessed as requiring the most urgent action or investigation. Full details including regional variations can be found in the chapter.

Chapter summary

Land, nature, and food make up the UK’s natural environment, covering everything above and below ground, as well as freshwater areas and nearby seas. Climate change is altering ecosystems, disrupting commercial sectors, degrading soil and carbon stores and threatening food security.

• Climate change presents a critical and growing threat to the UK’s food security (N10) due to our reliance on climate-vulnerable food imports, while climate impacts on soils and agricultural productivity (N4, N6) reduce domestic resilience. Future climate impacts in Europe could result in at least £1 billion annually being added to UK food prices.
• Biodiversity loss and habitat fragmentation are accelerating as a result of rising temperatures, extreme weather, and sea-level rise (N1:N5). Non-climate pressures including pollution, invasive species, and soil degradation, combine with climate change to weaken the health of land, freshwater, and marine ecosystems. Populations of UK seabirds such as puffins, storm petrels, and Arctic skuas could decline by up to 80% by the 2050s due to warming seas.
• Agriculture, fisheries and forestry are already being damaged by climate change (N6:N8). UK agriculture currently faces annual losses of around £1 billion due to extreme weather, and recent storms have damaged thousands of hectares of forests across the UK. Disruption to ecosystems from climate change has significant knock-on effects upon these industries.
• Increasingly frequent and extreme weather events will have severe impacts across the natural environment in the future. Extreme rainfall will erode soils more rapidly, peatlands and forestry will come under threat from increasing wildfire activity, and marine heatwaves will damage fisheries. Impacts are already leading to severe losses in crop harvest, for example by 2050 the proportion of ‘high-quality farmland’ in the UK is projected to shrink from 38% (1961-1990) to 11% due to droughts (N6).
• Awareness of climate risks across the natural environment sector is generally high but adaptation actions are frequently fragmented or siloed by geographical boundaries and with some important areas overlooked, such as impacts on blue carbon or soil health beyond arable farming. Evidence of adaptation action and it’s effectiveness is lacking across the whole sector.

Climate change is disrupting the UK food system and our access to safe, nutritious food. Extreme weather events, flooding, drought and soil erosion all affect domestic production, international imports and manufacturing. The UK is reliant on climate-vulnerable imports of fruit, vegetables, legumes and rice.

• Around 18% of the UK’s fruit and vegetables currently come from nations at high – and moderate – risk to climate change. Crop yields have declined in the South and East of Europe, increasing food insecurity in the UK, particularly for low-income households.
• By the 2060s, climate driven food price rises in Europe could be adding around £1 billion a year to UK national food costs, while domestic production will come under increasing pressure.
• Food strategies at the UK and nation-level recognise climate risks, but critical action is needed to address a lack of clear delivery plans which address systemic threats to food security.

Healthy soils underpin agriculture, water regulation, and wider ecosystem resilience. Climate change is increasing risks to soil stability and function, along with intensified runoff, erosion, pollutant mobilisation.

• Soil erosion across the UK is happening faster than soils can naturally recover, with the highest erosion rates in Wales and northern England where many peat soils are located. Around 16% of arable fields in the UK are losing soil at rates higher than a ‘tolerable’ level.
• Future impacts are expected to worsen, with UK soil erosion from rainfall projected to rise by at least 15% by 2050.
• Adaptation policies for soil risks are limited and Critical investigation is required to understand long-term (i.e. beyond the 2030s) climate risks to soil health. There is currently no coordinated long‑term UK strategy to support soil health other than for arable land.

Climate change is accelerating the decline of UK terrestrial and coastal ecosystems. Warming temperatures, drought, wildfires, sea-level rise and invasive species are reducing habitat area, biodiversity, and ecological function. Terrestrial and costal ecosystems are also affected by longstanding pressures such as pollution, fragmentation, drainage and land use change.

• There is strong evidence from the past 30 years of climate impacts on UK ecosystems, with clear, observed declines in species and habitats, and ecological processes shifting. For example, average UK flowering now occurs a month earlier than 30 years ago.
• Future impacts are projected to intensify. By the 2050s, UK National Nature Reserves will likely face significant climate risks, with around 95% exposed to hotter summers, especially in southern England, where temperatures may rise by over 1.5 °C, with about half facing lower river flows and higher wildfire risk, increasing stress on wildlife and habitats.
• Action is needed to accelerate and expand current UK responses, as adaptation is largely confined to protected areas and fragmented restoration efforts. Crucially, ecosystems are not currently considered alongside broader agricultural, coastal and development adaptation policy.

Climate change is degrading the UK’s freshwater ecosystems. Drought‑driven reductions in river flow, warmer water temperatures, and heavier rainfall all harm water quality and weaken the overall health of freshwater habitats. This threatens the biodiversity of these ecosystems as well as services such as flood regulation. Land-use change, pollution, and invasive species are important compounding factors.

• Freshwater ecosystems are already severely degraded, with no river in England or Northern Ireland currently rated as having good overall chemical health. Climate change is reshaping ecosystems with cold-water species like brown trout declining and invasive species spreading.
• By the 2050s, warming could push many freshwater ecosystems beyond their ability to adapt, leading to widespread biodiversity loss, habitat decline, and ecological disruption.
• Adaptation actions so far have had mixed success. National frameworks and strategies lack both clear objectives and long-term targets and more action is needed to address this risk. There is also an urgent need to monitor and understand the effectiveness of adaptation actions.

Marine ecosystems support biodiversity across the UK. They are increasingly disrupted by climate change, including warming waters, increased stratification, altered currents, acidification and de-oxygenation.

• The seas around the UK are warming rapidly; there are now about four more marine heatwave events per year compared to the 1980s. The resulting change in prey availability means that many seabirds are already at the southern limit of their breeding range.
• By 2100, models project major climate‑induced shifts in marine habitats, threatening Marine Protected Area (MPA) effectiveness.
• The marine environment and ecosystems are recognised in national adaption policies, particularly through the MPAs. However, MPAs are focused on protecting a certain habitat or species in present conditions, impact of climate change is not yet included in MPA planning. Thus, more action is needed to address gaps in implementation of planned adaptation measures as well as gather information on their effectiveness.

The UK’s natural carbon stores include peatlands, native woodlands, and coastal ecosystems. They face escalating risks as climate change increases warming, drying, and wildfire incidence. These pressures compound existing degradation from agriculture, drainage, pollution, and infrastructure development.

• Some peatlands, such as those in Northern Ireland, have already shifted from carbon sinks to net sources of carbon due to degradation and pressure from warming, droughts and wildfires. 80% of England’s peatlands are assessed as dry or degraded.
• Future warming will increase the risk to natural carbon stores. Scotland’s Flow Country peatlands, one of the largest bogs in Europe, could move outside the conditions required for peat formation by the 2080s.
• Adaptation efforts have increased in the last five years, but are fragmented and more action is needed, particularly around blue carbon in coastal and marine ecosystems which is currently poorly integrated into current policy frameworks.

Extreme weather driven by climate change is already affecting UK agriculture. Rising temperatures, shifting rainfall, and more frequent extreme events reduce productivity, damage soils and ecosystems, and increase pressure on farmers.

• UK agriculture is already experiencing losses of around £1 billion per year due to recent extreme events. Wet conditions in 2024 affected wheat yields, lowering production by 20%, while increased poultry deaths from extreme heat in summer 2022 reduced production by 2.6%.
• Risks to UK farms will increase as a result of climate change. By 2050, the proportion of ‘high-quality farmland’ in the UK is projected to shrink from 38% (1961-1990) to 11% due to drought.
• New agricultural policies are promoting climate resilience but there is still a need for more action to address gaps in strategic future targets as well as indicators to track changing climate risk and the effectiveness of adaptation. Building awareness of adaptation options amongst farmers, especially ‘quick wins’, would support more effective uptake.

Fisheries and aquaculture are an important part of the UK’s economy and food supply. They face significant threats from climate change including rising sea surface temperatures, more frequent and intense marine heatwaves, and ocean acidification, all of which exacerbate the impacts of pests and pathogens and alter the suitability of marine environments.

• Warming seas are shifting species distributions. Coldwater fish such as cod have declined, reducing North Sea catches, while warmwater species such as European seabass are becoming increasingly common.
• Future losses for fisheries from climate change could be severe with the Northwest Atlantic projected to face 12% average loss of fish by mid-century and up to 35% by 2100.
• While climate adaptation policies exist in this sector, they are inconsistently applied and management is fragmented. More action is needed to ensure that climate risks are not overlooked in fisheries planning and to coordinate across geographical boundaries.

Forests and the ecosystems they support are culturally significant to the UK and provide value through services and natural capital. They face increasing risks from climate change due to rising temperatures, shifting rainfall patterns, droughts, wildfires, and more frequent and intense extreme weather, in particular storms. Pests and diseases are also spreading more widely due to climate change.

• Extreme wind causes severe damage to UK forests and wind speeds are expected to increase in the future. Storm Arwen in 2021 affected around 4,000 hectares of Scottish forests and resulted in around 1 million m³ of fallen trees.
• Forest ecosystems are increasingly at risk of partial or total collapse within the next 50 years due to interacting climate-driven disturbances of wind, fire, pests, and bark beetles.
• New strategic action plans are helping support forestry adaptation across the UK, but more action is needed to understand where adaptation measures are actually being used as well as to consider compound risks, such as a windstorm immediately following a flooding event.

Infrastructure

Figure ES9: A repair platform fixes the railway line at Dawlish, Devon, following severe storm damage in 2014. This section of line has had to be repeatedly repaired in the following years, most recently after Storm Ingrid in January 2026. Image credit: Adobe Stock

This Report Card provides a summary of the Infrastructure chapter of the CCRA4 Independent Assessment’s Technical Report, including an overview of each of the risks assessed as requiring the most urgent action or investigation*. Full details including regional variations can be found in the chapter.

Chapter summary

Our national infrastructure includes transport, energy and digital communication networks, as well as waste and water systems. It underpins the functioning of our society and economy, but climate change is already causing costly impacts either by directly damaging our infrastructure as a result of intensifying extreme weather events or altering the surrounding environment.

• The highly interconnected nature of our national infrastructure makes it vulnerable to extreme weather; a failure in one network or system has a cascading effect which can impact other infrastructure services (I1). This interconnection will only deepen into the future as our systems become more integrated, particularly through electrification and the use of digital technologies.
• In many cases risks are compounded by the condition and design of long-life infrastructure assets like road (I5) and rail networks (I6), and sewage systems (I9). Often these assets are aging and may not be resilient even to our current climate.
• New technologies will bring major changes to our national infrastructure landscape, most importantly around electricity generation, transmission, and distribution (I2, I3), as well as for road transport (I5) and fuel supply (I4). This presents an opportunity to build climate resilience into new infrastructure and networks.
• Without effective adaptation, the intensification of extreme weather and the associated hazards will cause greater damage and disruption to our infrastructure networks. Adaptation plans and policies exist for most infrastructure sectors, and actions are starting to be implemented, but there needs to be increased monitoring and evaluation of adaptation actions to measure their effectiveness and the improvements to system resilience.
• England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales will each face their own individual challenges. For example, there is a high risk of collapse of coal spoil tips in Wales (I10), while Scotland has a relatively high number of private water supplies, serving about 2.5% of the population (I9).

The UK’s national infrastructure is highly interconnected – disruption to one system can trigger failures across others, amplifying extreme weather impacts. This reliance will deepen, as most infrastructure services are underpinned by changing electricity systems and are increasingly connected by digital and communication systems.

• Examples of critical infrastructure breakdown due to extreme weather are being increasingly documented. For example, a severe heatwave across the UK in July 2022 led to data centre outages at Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS Trust in London, disrupting clinical IT systems for weeks.
• Increasingly large and frequent damage to infrastructure from extreme weather could lead to severe losses of function across multiple systems, with estimated costs of £ billions annually by the 2050s.
• The impacts from cascading infrastructure failure could be severe and critical action is required to prepare for this risk. In particular, there is currently no systematic UK-wide assessment of infrastructure interdependencies. Additionally, there is an need to understand the downstream impacts of sector-specific adaptation strategies on interconnected systems.

The UK’s fuel supply system is complex, including infrastructure for the production, refining, storage and transport of both liquid and gaseous fuel. These diverse assets are exposed to impacts from extreme weather events, such as floods, droughts and wildfires, while high temperatures can reduce equipment operating capacity. As the UK decarbonises, the fuel supply system is also currently undergoing significant changes, bringing opportunities to build climate resilience.

• Although some evidence is available on current climate risks and the adaptation action that has taken place so far, critical investigation is required to address limited information on future climate risk to fuel supply systems and a lack of quantitative evidence for the benefits of adaptation, as well as gaps around monitoring and evaluation.

Road transport infrastructure, which includes active travel and bus services, underpins many of the other transport networks in the UK, as well as other infrastructure services. Without adaptation, road networks will suffer increasing impacts from more frequent and severe extreme weather in the future, for example from flooding, subsidence, and landslides.

• Current challenges around road transport systems include adapting legacy infrastructure which is not resilient to present-day or future climate risks, and addressing risks to local roads, which are less well-served than major road networks in terms of data, risk assessments, and adaptation planning.
• Beyond action to address present-day risks, critical investigation is needed to understand future climate risks to road transport, including evidence on the impact of adaptation to reduce risks.

Aviation, ports, shipping, and inland waterways face a range of risks from climate change. Flooding and extreme wind are the main hazards for aviation, while sea-level rise, coastal flooding, extreme temperatures and increased wind-load are the main hazards for ports and shipping. International shipping and aviation can be impacted by climate hazards outside of the UK.

• There is evidence of adaptation taking place in airports, but there are limited adaptation policies in place for ports and shipping and very limited evidence exists around inland waterways. However, current adaptation plans are focussed on short timeframes and critical investigation is needed to address the limited evidence around future climate risks, as well as to understand the effectiveness of adaptation action in the aviation and marine sectors.

Waste management systems include infrastructure such as landfill sites, waste incinerators, recycling and material recovery centres, but also nuclear waste and decommissioned power stations, and mining sites, particularly coal spoil tips. Impacts from climate change include release of landfill waste as a result of coastal erosion or flooding, but reported cases are local in scale.

• The climate risk to waste management systems is assessed as low across the UK apart from in Wales, where critical investigation is needed into the current high risk of potential coal spoil tip collapse which can occur as a result of heavy rainfall, although this risk is expected to reduce in the future as a result of adaptation actions.

UK electricity generation capacity will expand to meet rising demand, with a larger share coming from distributed renewables. The future power system will be more weather sensitive with a greater use of wind and solar generation. However, the system will continue to be designed to deal with variability from weather, which is anticipated to be larger than any projected changes in weather due to climate change.

• Evidence of current climate impacts on electricity generation is limited, but the system has demonstrated resilience to recent weather-related hazards.
• In the future, the number of power stations in England at serious risk of flooding could approximately double with a global temperature rise of 4 °C.
• There may be an increase in periods of low solar and wind resources for the UK which are anticipated to be managed through adequate planning for security of supply.
• Awareness of climate risks in this sector is high, but more action is needed to address a lack of detailed adaptation strategies and quantitative measures of success.

The electricity network in the UK is a mix of physical assets, such as pylons and undersea cables, which transmit electricity from power stations and connect to overseas networks. Infrastructure is increasingly vulnerable to droughts, flooding, overheating and high winds as extreme weather becomes more common. The electricity network is also currently undergoing a significant transformation and upgrade.

• Named storms have brought substantial disruption to electricity distribution networks in the UK – in 2022, storms Dudley, Eunice, and Franklin caused loss of power to over 1 million homes. Substation flooding is identified as the current risk with highest overall impact.
• It is not yet fully understood how planned expansion and upgrades to the electricity system will be affected by climate change; risks will increase, but this is also an opportunity for adaptation.
• More action is needed to address risks to electricity transmission and distribution systems in England, Scotland and Wales, as while adaptation is taking place, there is limited evidence on how effective that adaptation has been. Northern Ireland is not subject to the same reporting powers as the rest of the UK and so evidence for action to address future risks is limited.

Extreme weather affects rail networks both by damaging infrastructure and by causing service disruptions. Much of the UK’s rail network was built before modern-day design and construction standards, increasing the risk from climate hazards.

• In Great Britain, disruption costs from wind, flooding and subsidence were £383 million, £316 million and £144 million respectively, from 2006-2024 while the impact of extreme heat on rail networks has become more prominent in the past decade.
• Increasingly frequent and severe extreme weather events in the future could result in costs in the £ billions in England and £10s of millions in Scotland by the 2080s.
• Adaptation to climate change is recognised as essential by the sector; risk assessments and adaptation plans have been carried out across the UK. However, more action is needed to address a lack of quantitative evidence on the effectiveness of adaptation to date.

Water supply and wastewater infrastructure will come under increasing pressure from droughts and flooding, compounded by future population growth and an expected rise in industries with high water demand. Droughts, high temperatures, and floods will also pose a major threat to water quality, compounded by inadequate pollution control and an emerging risk from wildfires.

• The UK’s water supply and wastewater systems are currently vulnerable to extreme weather events. Drought in particular poses the principal threat to future UK water supply. For example, two drought-prone areas with high water abstraction have been identified in Scotland near the rivers Spey and Tay, where the frequency of drought could more than double by the 2080s.
• Planned adaptation action will reduce climate risk to this sector in the future, although the risk is still expected to remain high. More action is needed as the quality of adaptation planning is variable, lacking specificity and with limited evidence on quantitative measures of success or monitoring of implementation.

Economy

Figure ES10: Industrial zones such as the port at Feilxstowe, Suffolk, are major hubs for the transport of goods, but are at risk from saline intrusion, more severe storm surges, and erosion, as a result of sea level rise. Image credit: Adobe Stock This Report Card provides a summary of the Economy chapter of the CCRA4 Independent Assessment’s Technical Report, including an overview of each of the risks assessed as requiring the most urgent action or investigation. Full details including regional variations can be found in the chapter.

Chapter overview

Climate change poses significant risks to the UK economy, affecting macroeconomic stability, business assets, supply chains, productivity and labour, public and private finance, households, and adaptation opportunities. Most economic risks have become more urgent since the CCRA3-IA-TR, except for household finances. Many risks were not listed individually in the CCRA3-IA, reflecting the growing recognition of economic challenges.

• The overall economy of the UK, the macroeconomy, has already been affected by climate change and these impacts are expected to rise sharply in the future (E1). Under a ‘current policies’ scenario, the UK economy could see losses of at least 7.4% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by the end of the century.
• The impact of climate change on the economy is an aggregate of all risks in this report and the potentially severe economic losses reflect an urgent need for adaptation across all sectors.
• The UK’s economy is exposed to rising international climate risks due to globalised supply chains, overseas business assets and its role as a financial hub. Climate shocks abroad directly influence UK production, prices and macroeconomic stability (E1, E2, E3, E5). Rising global demand for adaptation goods and services presents opportunities for UK businesses (E8).
• Without adaptation, households will face increasing financial pressures which will disproportionately affect vulnerable groups and the less well-off. Rising food prices could cost the average household about £275 more per year by 2050, insurance premiums will increase and many people will face direct costs to repair their homes following extreme climate events.
• Compared to other sectors, less quantitative evidence is available on how climate change will affect the UK’s economy, and so the assessment of climate risks and urgency for action in this chapter also use expert opinion along with evidence from other countries. Additionally, extreme climate outcomes are generally not accounted for in macroeconomic modelling. This highlights an urgent need for measurements and modelling of economic climate impacts on the UK.
• Awareness of climate-related economic risks is growing, but as highlighted throughout this report, there is a need for robust evaluation of real-world effectiveness of adaptation actions in order to fully understand the risks from climate change to the economy.

The macroeconomy refers to the economy at the national level, so this risk represents an aggregation and synthesis of all other sectoral risks across the CCRA4-IA-TR. Climate change poses complex risks to the overall UK economy, affecting GDP, inflation and productivity, with increasing economic shocks from floods, droughts and storms disrupting trade, investment and fiscal stability in the UK and overseas.

• The costs imposed by climate change are already significant, even at the current level of warming. For the last decade a lower bound on economic losses in the UK due to climate change is between £2-10 billion per year (0.05-0.35% of current GDP).
• Future economic damages are expected to rise sharply. Substantial GDP losses are expected at higher levels of warming; under a ‘current policies’ scenario with 4 °C temperature rise by the end of the century, the UK economy could see losses of at least 7.4% GDP.
• Progress on UK adaptation overall is assessed as inadequate and so preparedness for climate risks to the macroeconomy are considered limited. Critical action is needed to ensure that adaptation delivery matches the scale of risks identified across the whole of this report and to address the lack of macroeconomic risk indicators that can be used in adaptation planning.

Business infrastructure, equipment and property in the UK and overseas are at risk from physical climate hazards such as floods and heatwaves. These can cause disruption to operations, damage infrastructure, stop production, and increase insurance costs, leading to reduced asset values.

• Extreme weather currently causes major financial costs for UK businesses — the estimated direct costs of flood damage to business properties across the UK is £670 million per year. 40% of business-critical infrastructure in England is currently at risk from flooding.
• UK owned assets are widely spread globally, exposing firms to different climate risks. Half of the UK’s foreign investment is in Europe, where flood risk is the largest physical climate risk.
• Despite significant progress, challenges remain and critical action is needed to address an uneven uptake of climate adaptation measures, with small and medium-sized enterprises often constrained by financial or informational barriers.

The financial and insurance services sector is a significant part of the national economy; in 2023 it contributed £208.2 billion to the UK (8.8% of total economic output). Climate risks in this sector already influence lending from banks, underwriting of insurance and capital allocation from investors.

• Current economic damage to the UK’s financial system is material but not yet considered system-threatening and is estimated in £ hundreds of millions. UK institutions are highly exposed to climate risks due to their central role in international finance, but to date have not experienced significant climate‑related liability losses.
• Climate risks to the finance sector will increase with warming and more frequent extreme weather. By the 2050s, climate‑related insurance claims and loan losses are expected to rise with UK insurers facing ~50% higher annual losses under severe scenarios. There is evidence that physical climate risks are not assessed accurately by the financial system, for example, 65% of insurers currently use historical claims data for pricing, rather than models that adjust for future climate change.
• There has been progress in identifying and managing climate‑related financial risks, but these measures are only partial and critical action is needed as the scale and speed of climate impacts may outpace current risk management and supervisory tools.

UK supply chains are vulnerable to climate impacts, particularly where they are global, complex, or concentrated. Extreme weather events can be highly damaging for critical transport and other infrastructure, both in the UK and internationally. Supply chains are crucially important to the UK’s food security and for our health system.

• UK supply chains are highly globalised, putting them at risk from climate shocks. A fifth of the economic value from UK global supply chains originates in countries and regions at ‘medium’ to ‘very high’ levels of climate risk.
• Infrastructure for supply chains will be a greater risk from climate impacts in the future. 95% of all UK trade, by volume, is transported by sea. The number of key global ports at high risk from multiple climate hazards could nearly double by 2100 — rising from 385 to 691.
• Some action is taking place at a national level as well as within businesses. However, overall the UK is only partially prepared for climate disruption to supply chains and critical investigation is needed to build the evidence base for adaptation action, in particular there is lack of comprehensive mapping of UK supply chain dependencies.

Climate change has already had direct and indirect impacts on the UK’s workforce. For example, heatwaves affect people’s health and productivity in the workplace, while increased flooding will affect their ability to get to their workplaces. Those sectors of the economy involving outdoor labour, such as agriculture and construction, are particularly vulnerable.

• Extreme temperatures already affect people’s productivity and health in the UK. Hot days are currently estimated to cost the UK £1.2 billion per year in productivity losses.
• Long-term estimates of extreme heat’s impact on labour productivity are highly uncertain due to unpredictability of future work practices, for example, the role of AI, automation technologies, hybrid working policies, and shifting job types and locations.
• Evidence gaps in UK-specific data limit the assessment of this risk and critical investigation is needed to understand current and future impacts on labour productivity from heat stress.

The government’s core fiscal levers for managing public finances – taxation, borrowing and spending – all face growing pressure from climate change. Rising adaptation costs and increased demand for disaster recovery put increased demands on government expenditure, while tax receipts may decrease because of reduced output, productivity and growth.

• Estimates suggest that that government spending in response to current climate impacts in the UK is about £4-5 billion per year, with costs estimated to be around £10 billion a year to reach adaptation goals.
• Risks are expected to increase over time with evidence suggesting that every additional degree of warming will raise government consumption by about 0.32%.
• While there is growing awareness and interest around risks to public finances from climate change, there is a major lack of evidence specifically addressing this risk. Critical investigation is needed to fully understand the magnitude of possible costs such as datasets and reporting of annual climate-related expenditure by the UK government.

Households and individuals will face financial costs and burdens from climate change. These can be direct, for example through flood damage to property or increases in food prices, and indirect, for example from rising insurance costs and disruptions to employment. The impacts will be highly unequal, with lower income and vulnerable groups at greatest risk.

• Households are already facing higher costs as a result of climate change – across the years 2022 to 2023, average UK food and energy bills increased by about £605 due to climate-related shocks.
• Climate costs to households will increase in coming decades. Homeowners in flood-prone areas will have to pay, on average, an additional £60-80 per year by the 2050s on repairing damaged housing or contents. While there will be reduced energy demand for heating, with the largest benefit for poor households, energy demand for cooling will increase, although ownership of air conditioning will likely be concentrated in higher-income households.
• Overall, future costs to households will strongly depend upon the climate adaptation measures taken more broadly across society, as described in the other risks in CCRA4-IA TR. Very limited evidence is available that is specific to the UK and critical investigation is needed to understand household-level financial exposure to climate risks.

As national and global climate pressures increase, demand for adaptation solutions will grow across all sectors of society. This will create opportunities for UK businesses, such as developing flood‑resilience technologies or climate‑related insurance products. Providing enabling conditions for market opportunities is crucial, for example, by using public investment to unlock adaptation action.

• Adaptation goods and services are already a significant opportunity for the UK. An increase in demand for adaptation services could become a market valued at several billion pounds, based on the current size of the UK environmental advisory services market (around £2.9 billion in 2022).
• These opportunities are set to increase significantly in the future. The growth potential of the global adaptation market is about 10% per year and could reach £36.5 billion by 2032.
• Preparedness will depend on how well-equipped businesses are to take advantage of these opportunities, supported and enabled by government. Currently national policy and strategy frameworks provide little detail on opportunities for climate adaptation sector and there is a lack of metrics to track the contribution of adaptation to the economy. Critical investigation is required to understand the size and growth potential of these markets.

References

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